ABSTRACT
Examining Representative Bureaucracy in State Administration
Recent empirical studies have established the importance of representative bureaucracy in the American political system (Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier 1993a; Hindera 1993; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998) . These investigations have expanded our knowledge of the administrative process, confirming suggestions that originated with Kingsley (1944) and were extended by Long (1952) , Van Riper (1958) , and Mosher (1982) . They establish that, at least in some circumstances, bureaucrats have sufficient discretion and inclination to translate values based on their demographic origins into policies that benefit the demographic groups from which they were drawn.
In the American states, the extent of passive bureaucratic representation-that is, the degree to which the bureaucracy reflects the larger population in its demographic compositionhas been widely researched (Sigelman 1976; Dometrius 1984; Rehfuss 1986; Bullard and Wright 1993; Riccucci and Saidel 1997) . However, few studies have been conducted on active representation at the state level (Hale and Kelly 1989) . Active representation is defined here as the process of bureaucrats advancing the interests of groups with whom they share demographic origin (Selden 1997, 43) .
This research extends the study of representative bureaucracy to the upper reaches of state government. It examines the potential for active representation of nonwhites 1 and women by senior state administrators, the heads of agencies across the fifty states. Building on recent research by Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) , we propose and test a model of representative bureaucracy in which administrators' conceptions of their organizational work roles plays a crucial part. In the present study, the organizational role concept is based on analysis of the values or goals senior state administrators hold for their agencies; the values or goals emanate from earlier research by Posner and Schmidt (1994) on federal executives. After we explore the distinctiveness of the values professed by nonwhite and women agency heads, we develop an empirical measure of the organizational role set based on the responses of a sample of high-level state administrators to an array of values items. With this role concept, we elaborate and test a model of representative bureaucracy for administrators at the top of state bureaucracy.
THE ANALYTIC MODEL
....... , .. Extending Thompson's (1976) earlier work, Kenneth J.
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representation might vary from one society to another. Kingsley (1944, 183-85) initially suggested in the British context that class representation would be critical, although he also addressed the need to expand representation of women in the civil service. Meier (1993c) contended that the extent to which demographic origins provide unique socializing experiences is centrally important; to the extent they do, this socialization may produce distinctive value preferences for a particular demographic group. Individuals who are drawn from that group to bureaucratic positions may use the values assimilated early in life as part of the basis on which they make policy decisions. Their decisions thereby may accord with the interests of die group from which they were drawn or which they represent. Thus passive representation becomes active representation. Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) have further developed this theoretical framework by suggesting that the effect of administrators' demographic backgrounds is mediated by the organizational roles they assume.
Exhibit 1 is based on this previous research; it depicts the model that guides the present analysis of representative bureaucracy. We anticipate that the values senior administrators hold toward the goals and objectives of their organizations-here designated their organizational role set-are essential for defining their jobs as state executives. Rainey (1997, , Ammons and Newell (1989) , Abney and Lauth (1986) , and Anderson, Newland, and Stillman (1983) have explored the values and roles of executives in state and local governments and the relationship of these values and roles to administrative attitudes and behavior. As shown in exhibit 1, the organizational role set examined here is expected to affect the operation of representative bureaucracy among senior state administrators.
In accord wiui findings of prior research on representative bureaucracy, we anticipate that administrators' organizational role sets are influenced by the demographic groups from which they are drawn (Meier 1993c; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998) . In their examination of representative bureaucracy as exhibited by county supervisors in the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), Selden, Brudney, and Kellough found that race was the strongest predictor of adherence to a minority representative role, and that-in turn-assumption of this (minority representative) role mediated between race/ethnicity and policy outcomes. They concluded that among these county-level bureaucrats, "the indications are that adherence to the minority representative role exerts an influence on administrative behavior above and beyond race" (p. 737).
As shown in exhibit 1, the model includes several control variables that represent personal background and organizational socialization characteristics. Rosenbloom and Kinnard (1977) found that age (or generation) can affect minority advocacy. Level of education also has been linked to the attitudes of administrators toward improving conditions of minority groups (Meier and Nigro 1976) , and Thompson (1978) found that administrators' positions on an ideological scale were related to their receptivity to hiring minorities. Exploring the possible effects of organizational socialization, Meier and Stewart (1992) and Meier (1993a) found that upper-level managerial personnel (school principals) were less likely than street-level bureaucrats (teachers) to exhibit characteristics of representative bureaucracy. Accordingly, both personal background and organizational socialization factors are included as control variables in the model, in anticipation that these may influence the process by which passive representation becomes active representation.
effects mediated by the role set, among these senior state administrators both gender and race/ethnicity may influence attitudes and behavior directly. We anticipate this possibility (reflected by the broken line in exhibit 1) for two reasons. First, unlike the county-level officials who were studied by Selden, Brudney, and Kellough, these state executives are highly visible and, therefore, are likely targets of interest group activity. Nonwhite administrators and women may receive particular attention from interest groups representing those interests, seeking to expand their effectiveness through direct contact and persuasion. Second, because this examination considers senior administrators, role set is operationalized more broadly than it was by Selden, Brudney, and Kellough. As we have noted, those scholars examined only "adherence to minority representative role." Here, because we include an organizational role set that is appropriate for senior administrators, one that is necessarily more broadly defined, we anticipate that uie role will less completely filter or mediate the effect of gender and racial/ethnic background variables on important organizational attitudes and behaviors.
COMPARING ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES
We examine the potential for active representation among two demographic groups of state agency heads: nonwhites and women. As exhibit 1 suggests, a first step in the analysis is to determine if these groups differ significantly from their counterparts at the top of state executive agencies with regard to the weight they attach to important organizational goals. The specific values or goals we examine are derived from a listing provided by Posner and Schmidt (1994) in their study of federal execu-2 Survey questionnaires were distributed to jives heads or directors of ninety-three types of agencies in the fifty states. Because some agencies are not represented in all states.
The database for the present research is drawn from the the total population of agency heads sur-American State Administrators Project (ASAP), a 1994 survey of veyed was 3365. The response rate was l22 g age ncy heads from ninety-three types of agencies across all 37 percent (1229). To assess possible _. The results in exhibit 2 show that nonwhite and women agency heads differ significantly from whites and men, respectively, on several of the values they hold for state administration. On average, nonwhite agency heads consider organizational growth and budget stability to be much more important than do whites. The difference in mean scores on these items by race/ ethnicity is the largest found in the exhibit, and it is highly significant statistically (p < .005). For their part, women senior administrators give greater weight than do men to every organizational goal in the exhibit, except organizational growth. For six of the items, the differences in means are statistically significant, and for a seventh, customer service, the differences nearly achieve significance (p < .108). Although the gender-based 496IJ-PART, July 2000 mean differences are not large, the consistency with which women rate these organizational values as more important is pronounced, with women professing stronger commitment than men to such values as organizational effectiveness, quality, and high morale. Meier (1993b) indicates that the public expects bureaucrats to meet two principal standards. The first is organizational competence or proficiency; public agencies are obliged to carry out responsibilities effectively and efficiently and to do so in a timely manner (132-37). The second is responsiveness, the expectation that agencies be open to the environment, sensitive to demands from affected interests and from the broader public (123-32). This standard directly relates to representative bureaucracy, the central theme of this investigation. Although these two values may conflict at times, Americans expect bureaucrats to be both competent and responsive.
FROM ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES TO ORGANIZATIONAL ROLES
These values do not exhaust the core goals of senior bureaucrats. The budget-maximizing bureaucrat that public choice economists describe pursues values that further the agency's position within the competitive political structure (Blais and Dion 1991a). As formulated by William Niskanen (1971 and 1991) , bureaucrats, like all other individuals, seek to maximize a personal utility function. "Among the several variables that may enter the bureaucrat's utility function are the following: salary, perquisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage, output of the bureau, ease of making changes, and ease of managing the bureau" (1971, 33) . Niskanen noted that "all of these variables except the last two . . . are a positive monotonic function of the total budget of the bureau during the bureaucrat's term in office" (p. 8). From this perspective, then, it is the budget that bureaucrats seek to maximize.
3 'Niskanen originally suggested that it was total budget that bureaucrats sought to maximize. In his later writings, he accepted die suggestion of Migue and Be'langer (1974) dial it is discretionary budget. Nevertheless, Blais and Dion (1991b, 6) note diat the revised model "also assumes that it is in the bureaucrats' interest to get a larger budget."
Research that tests public choice theory as it is applied to bureaucracy has been limited and has produced inconsistent results (Blais and Dion 1991a; Rainey 1997) . Nevertheless, there is ample reason to anticipate that many administrators (if not all) will value budget expansion and growth, at least to some degree (Downs 1967, 107) . Blais and Dion (1991c, 356-59) note that since evidence of administrators' direct personal financial gain is weak, perhaps they seek budget increases because of other values they hold-that larger budgets are substantively warranted or wDl personally benefit them by improving the prestige of their The values items in the ASAP survey shown in exhibit 2 capture both the standards of agency competence and organizational budget and growth. The goals of high productivity, efficiency, effectiveness, quality, and customer service pertain to the first value. Although the items did not directly tap budget maximization, they did ask the agency heads about the importance they attached to organizational growth and budget stability.
Organizational Role Sets
In order to examine the dimensionality of the goal itemsand to begin to develop empirical measures of the organizational role set-we performed a factor analysis of these items. Principal components analysis (and varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization) yielded three factors (see exhibit 3). Together, the three factors account for 60.3 percent of the variation in the ten goal items.
Two factors comport well with the general value dimensions from the public administration literature we have discussed. The first factor can be identified as an organizational proficiency dimension. Positive and substantial loadings of values such as effectiveness, productivity, quality, efficiency, and customer service all support this designation. The morale item-the lone item that focuses on organizational employees-loads highly on this factor, but less strongly than do the other measures.
The second factor represents organizational reputation, often critically important to an agency's ability to build and maintain strong relationships with significant external actors (Meier 1993b, 57-68) . This factor includes not only the reputation item but also an item that assesses the value organizational leadership. It reflects values that administrators hold about how their organizations are viewed by others.
The third factor is organizational growth. Both the growth item and the item assessing the executive's view of budget stability load highly on this factor. The factor taps administrative values concerned with protecting the agency budgetary base (stability) as a foundation for organizational expansion.
In constructing the organizational role set, we concentrate on the proficiency and the growth value dimensions, for two main reasons. First, as we have elaborated, the theoretical foundation for these factors is stronger than it is for organizational reputation; they have a substantial tradition in both research and practice in public administration (Meier 1993b; Niskanen 1971 and 1991) . Second, while the behavioral implications of these two factors are relatively clear, organizational reputation can be achieved in a variety of ways and through a variety of means, including pursuit of the proficiency and growth value sets. In fact, scaled scores on the proficiency dimension are strongly related to scores on the reputation dimension (r = .455), as are scaled scores on the organization growth dimension, although much less strongly (r = .204). These empirical associations suggest possible meanings or interpretations that high-level state administrators may have for organizational reputation. Other interpretations are possible as well, some that further cloud the attitudinal and behavioral implications of a commitment to this value set.
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The crucial element in our model of representative bureaucracy (depicted in exhibit 1) is the administrator's value or role set. The role set is hypothesized to mediate between passive representation, the demographic characteristics of agency heads (race and/or gender) on the one hand, and active representation, their administrative attitudes and behavior, on the other. The model also allows (and tests) for the possibility that active representation may occur directly through the influence of race and gender on administrative attitudes and behavior. 
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We use the budgetary growth and organizational proficiency value dimensions identified through the factor analysis to create the organizational role sets. These value dimensions, which are consistent with the model in exhibit 1, are correlated significantly with the demographic characteristics that are the focus of our attention here: race/ethnicity and gender. As expected-given the analysis of the individual values presented in exhibit 2-nonwhite administrators were more likely to have higher scores on-show greater commitment to-the organizational growth dimension dian were white administrators (p < .0001); these two groups did not differ significantly on the organizational proficiency dimension. Again, as anticipated by the findings in exhibit 2, comparison of the female and male state administrators demonstrated the converse pattern: Women had significantly higher scores on die organizational proficiency dimension (p < .005), but they did not differ from men on the organizational growth dimension. In sum, as hypothesized by our model of representative bureaucracy (exhibit 1), race/ethnicity and gender are associated with the two value dimensions that underlie the organizational role set.
Because state agency heads simultaneously have values regarding organizational growth and proficiency, we constructed measures of the administrators' organizational role set based on combining responses to the two value dimensions. We explored two approaches to this. In the first we generated factor scores on each dimension, and in the second we summed individual responses to the items that loaded highly on each dimension. As exhibit 4 shows, for the organizational growth dimension, the items that load highly are growth and budget stability, and for the organizational proficiency dimension, the values that load highly are effectiveness, high productivity, quality, efficiency, customer service, and high morale. In each case, we divided the scores on die dimensions at the median to create two groups of administrators, the first consisting of those who ranked low on the dimension (below the median) and the second consisting of those who ranked high (above the median).
The final step in creating uie organizational role set variable was to cross tabulate and combine the scores on die two dimensions diat had been generated under each procedure, thereby creating in each case four archetypical organizational role sets for state agency heads, as shown in exhibit 4. By applying this procedure we created two role set variables: The first was based on generating factor scores for the dimensions and the second was based on summing die responses of the administrators to uie items that loaded highly on the dimensions. Because the latter approach yielded somewhat stronger findings, it is used and reported in our analysis. The first role set (cell I in exhibit 4) is labeled passive orientation, because it combines low scores on the organizational proficiency dimension with low scores on the growth dimension. Although other values may animate and direct these state administrators, given their standing on at least these two dimensions they can be considered to have a passive orientation relative to the other agency heads. By contrast, cell IV combines high scores on both the organizational proficiency and growth dimensions. This role set is likely to entail trade-offs among key values for the agency heads who adopt it (for example, between a commitment to values of efficiency versus growth, quality, and customer service versus budget stability), and therefore it identifies a balanced orientation to state administration. The remaining two organizational role sets, growth orientation (cell II) and proficiency orientation (cell III), classify administrators who rank high (above the median) on one of the dimensions and low (below the median) on the other.
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TESTING A MODEL OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY IN STATE ADMINISTRATION
The model that guides the present analysis follows and extends the research of Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) on representative bureaucracy. Those researchers hypothesized mat the effect of demographic variables such as race on the work
50VJ-PART, July 2000
at D H Hill Library -Acquis Dept S on April 2, 2013 http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from attitudes and behavior of public administrators-active representation-would be mediated by the assumption of an organizational role. Their empirical analysis of county supervisors at the Farmer's Home Administration, which was consistent with this interpretation of representative bureaucracy, found that race (minority) was strongly associated with adherence to a (minority representative) role perception (p. 732). Identification with this role perception, in turn, was the strongest predictor of the crucial dependent variable, the percentage of loan eligibility determinations awarded to minority applicants (p. 736).
Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) concentrated on a single organizational role set, one especially close to the concept of race. By contrast, for the present sample of state agency heads, the role set is conceived much more broadly, based on an analysis of the goals held by these administrators for their organizations. As we show in exhibit 4, four distinct role sets are considered: a passive orientation, a balanced orientation, a growth orientation, and a proficiency orientation toward the agency. As in the Selden, Brudney, and Kellough study, demographic variables (race and gender) are associated with the goals that underlie the organizational role sets (exhibit 2). However, since these roles lack the racial connotation of the minority representative role set, we anticipate that race and gender may also manifest direct effects on administrative attitudes and behavior. In order to detect these relationships reliably, as in previous research on representative bureaucracy, the model must control for the influence of personal background variables (administrators' age, education, and ideology) and organizational socialization (experience in the position and in the agency).
Independent Variables
To test empirically this conception of representative bureaucracy in the sample of state agency heads, we performed a series of multiple regression analyses. In each case the explanatory model is the same.
As we show in exhibit 1, the model includes demographic characteristics (race and gender), personal background variables, organizational socialization factors, and the organizational role set. Given the focus on representative bureaucracy, we are primarily interested in whether race and gender might have direct effects on the administrative attitudes and behavior of the state agency heads, or whether those effects might be mediated by the organizational role set, as found by Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) 
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dummy (0/1) variables, each corresponding to one of the role sets identified in exhibit 4: the growth, proficiency, and balanced orientations. Regression analysis requires that the fourth organizational role set, the passive orientation, be omitted explicitly from the equation so as to avoid multicollinearity among the explanatory variables; it serves as the reference category by which the effects of the other role sets on administrative attitudes and behavior can be assessed and interpreted. With regard to the demographic variables, race is coded 0 for whites and 1 for nonwhites, and gender is coded 0 for men and 1 for women.
As the literature on representative bureaucracy makes clear, to distinguish the effects of race and gender, the model must control for personal background variables and organizational socialization (Meier 1993c ; Selden 1997, 119-24) . Accordingly, the model includes as explanatory variables: educational attainment (in years); age; ideology (self-assessed on a seven-point scale from "very conservative" to "very liberal"); total years of service in the agency; and total years of service in the position of agency head.
Dependent Variables
Ideally, dependent variables used to test hypotheses about representative bureaucracy would include policy decisions that are directly relevant to the groups passively represented, since it is then that bureaucrats would be most affected by values of the group from which they were drawn (Meier 1993a) . Prior studies met this criterion by examining single agencies or distinctive agency types (Meier and Stewart 1992; Meier 1993a; Hindera 1993; Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998) . Here, because we consider the potential for representative bureaucracy across ninety-three agency types in all fifty states, our dependent variables must be a step removed from those most preferred. We rely on administrators' reports of their behavior, preferences, and attitudes; we focus especially on items that might relate to preferences of passively represented groups or reflect administrators' efforts to further the interests of these groups, again as selfreported. Rather than rely on a single dependent variable, we examine multiple variables and look for patterns in the results. external actors (governors, governors' staff, legislators, legislative staff, personnel of other agencies, clientele groups, citizens-public at large, national officials, and local officials), again as self-reported. With respect to the latter variable, administrators indicated the frequency of personal contact with each actor (never, less than monthly, monthly, weekly, daily), and scores were assigned to their responses (from 1 to 5). An index of the level of external contact was created by summing the responses across the nine actors, so diat higher scores indicate more extensive contact.
The second category of dependent variables consists of the preferences of the agency heads regarding the level of influence that should be exerted on major agency policy decisions by important actors: citizens, clientele groups, agency staff, and directors themselves. On a scale from low to high (1 to 4), the survey asked administrators to indicate the degTee of influence that each of these groups should exert on major policy decisions.
The third dependent variable category encompasses the attitudes of the administrators toward the expansion of state programs and of their own agencies. The survey asked the administrators to what degree the overall level of programs, services, and expenditures of the state should be reduced or increased, and analogously, whether the specific programs and services of their agencies should be reduced or increased. In addition, administrators whose agencies received federal aid were asked whether they favored a decrease or increase in aid for existing grant programs, and whether they favored an expansion of federal aid to include support of new programs for the agency.
Findings
Exhibits 5 and 6 report the results of the regression analyses testing the model of representative bureaucracy. Aldiough none of the nine dependent variables examined pertain to specific policy outcomes, a wide range of administrative attitudes and behavior of the agency heads is captured by these measures. If active representative bureaucracy operates among the state executives, we would expect to see its effects manifested either directly through nonwhites or women adopting distinctive administrative attitudes and behavior, or indirecdy through the mediating influence of the organizational role sets. Accordingly, we concentrate most attention on the coefficients for these variables. Exhibit 5 presents the regression analyses of the behavioral measures and the preferred influence items. Exhibit 6 shows the findings for the dependent variables tapping attitudes toward state and agency expansion. .048**** 1028
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Exhibit 5 Regression Analyses of Behavioral Measures and Influence Preferences of Agency Heads
Each column of the exhibit corresponds to a different dependent variable. Exhibit reports regression partial slopes (b) with associated level of statistical significance as appropriate.
•••• Statistically significant at p < .005 •*• Statistically significant at p < .01 ** Statistically significant at p < .05 * Statistically significant at p < .10
As hypothesized, with regard to all nine dependent variables, the role set variables have statistically significant and substantively meaningful effects. The regression coefficients for the role set variables correspond to adjustments to the omitted or reference category, the passive organizational role set that combines low values on both the organizational growth and proficiency dimensions. With respect to hours worked per week, for example, state agency heads who have adopted a proficiency organizational role set report working on average about two more hours (b = 2.043) than do those with a passive role orientation (exhibit 5). Similarly, administrators with a balanced role orientation combining both proficiency and organizational growth values report working on average almost exactly the same number of hours more (b = 1.908). With respect to the second behavioral variable, the level of contact with external actors, .068**** 768'
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This survey item was presented only to state agency heads whose agencies receive federal aid or other federal fiscal assistance.
••** Statistically significant at p < .005 ••* Statistically significant at p < .01 *• Statistically significant at p < .05 * Statistically significant at p < .10 state agency heads with a proficiency orientation report more contact than do administrators with any of the other orientations (exhibit 5).
The organizational role set adopted by the agency heads also appears to affect their preferences regarding the influence of citizens, staff, and directors themselves on major agency policy decisions (exhibit 5). Administrators with a proficiency role orientation (b = .191) with the three other role sets register preferences for greater influence, but not to the same degTee: Administrators who have a growth orientation are least favorable toward staff and selfinfluence; those with a proficiency orientation are somewhat more favorable; and those with a balanced organizational role orientation are most inclined to have the agency staff and the director exercise influence. Given the conflicts inherent in balancing growth and proficiency values, it may be the case that the balanced organizational role orientation (which combines high scores on both dimensions) entails a more ambitious or difficult policy agenda for the agency and its director-for the achievement of which these administrators seek strong influence for themselves and their staff.
The regression results presented in exhibit 6 concerning the attitudes of the administrators toward expansion are highly consistent. Expansion refers to overall state spending and services, agency programs and services, federal aid for existing agency programs, and federal aid for new agency programs. Again, the organizational role set is meaningfully associated with each dependent variable. As might have been anticipated, administrators who adopt the growth role orientation feel most strongly and positively toward state and agency expansion. Even though state agency heads with the balanced role orientation are also positive toward expansion, in every case they are less expansionist than those with the growth orientation. This finding suggests that for administrators with a balanced role set, the commitment to organizational growth is moderated by the weight simultaneously accorded to proficiency.
We had hypothesized that the effects of race and gender on the administrative attitudes and behaviors of the state agency heads would be mediated through the organizational role set (Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 1998) . The data in exhibit 2 suggest that in the sample of state agency heads, nonwhites and women do differ with respect to the emphasis placed on the values that underlie the organizational roles: As a group, nonwhite executives placed a higher premium on die growth values than did whites, and women embraced the proficiency values more firmly than did men. In the regression analyses in exhibits 5 and 6, moreover, these role sets are associated statistically with administrative attitudes and behaviors, thus lending empirical support to the hypothesized mediating effect of the organizational role in theories of representative bureaucracy.
The regression analyses also test for direct effects of race/ ethnicity and gender on the dependent variables. Here the findings are both less consistent and more intriguing. 
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the mediating effect of the organizational role set demonstrated in these analyses, in five of die eighteen instances in which we examined me direct effects (i.e., nine regression equations, each including dummy variables for race and gender) race/ethnicity and/or gender manifests a statistically significant effect on the attitudes and behaviors examined. According to the findings in exhibit 5, both nonwhites (b = -1.01) and women (b = -1.14) report significantly less contact on average with actors outside their agencies than do whites and men, respectively. These findings support evidence from prior research that both nonwhites and women in public organizations are likely to have fewer networks and less complex networks than do white males, in part because nonwhites and women have fewer counterparts with whom they can develop professional relationships (Ibarra 1993) . Furthermore, the results suggest diat members of underrepresented groups at the top of state agencies are likely to have significantly less contact wiui external actors, perhaps because the larger state organizational cultures in which they must function have not facilitated development of contacts by nonwhites and women inside and outside state government, and because the number of nonwhites and women in senior administrative and political positions remains modest.
The regression analyses of attitudes toward state and agency expansion presented in exhibit 6 also show that nonwhite agency directors endorse increasing the size of state government and their agencies significandy more uian do other administratorseven taking into account their greater identification widi organizational growth values. In three of the four regression equations pertaining to expansionist attitudes, the coefficients for race/ ethnicity attain statistical significance, and in the remaining equation the coefficient is nearly significant (for attitudes toward expansion of agency programs and services, p < .115). An important implication for theories of representative bureaucracy is that to the degree that expansion of state and agency services, programs, and spending has special relevance to nonwhite populations, this value is manifested strongly in die attitudes of high-level nonwhite administrators. Given their positions at the heads of state agencies, moreover, diese administrators likely have the opportunity-and the inclination-to act on tins commitment. (Bullard and Wright 1993; Riccucci and Saidel 1997; Bowling and Wright 1998) . A question that prior research has not addressed is whether such passive representationemployment in state bureaucracy-is linked to active representation-policy or program results. Toward that end, our inquiry has developed a model and tested it empirically in a large sample of state agency directors.
CONCLUSION
To a considerable degree, agency heads are responsible for setting the tone of their organizations, influencing the culture and agendas of these institutions, and establishing the agencies' mission and purpose. In order to better understand how these high level administrators approach their leadership responsibilities, we examined the emphasis they place on a series of organizational goals developed by Posner and Schmidt (1994) . As a group, nonwhites placed much greater emphasis on goals of organizational growth and budget stability, and women placed greater emphasis on values pertaining to organizational proficiency (exhibit 2). Based on the relative importance the sample of agency heads attaches to these two value dimensions, we developed measures of their organizational role sets.
Following the research of Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) on the Farmer's Home Administration, we had hypothesized that the organizational role set would affect work behaviors of the administrators, their preferences regarding the influence of various groups, and attitudes toward bureaucratic expansion. Across the nine dependent variables we examined, the findings were consistent with this hypothesis (exhibits 5 and 6). Contrary to die FmHA study, however, which found that the minority representative role set mediated between demographic characteristics (race) on the one hand and policy outputs (loan determinations) on the other, in the present research race/ethnicity and gender also manifested direct effects on some of the attitudes and behavior of the state administrators.
For example, both race and gender were associated with the level of external contact of the agency heads; nonwhites and women reported significantly less contact with other actors, on average, than their counterparts in state administration. More striking, on a battery of items tapping attitudes toward expansion of dieir own agency and state programs generally, nonwhite administrators as a group were consistently more expansionist than whites, even taking into account dieir greater identification with the values reflected in the organizational growth role set. These findings raise important implications for theories of representative bureaucracy. As in the Selden, Brudney, and Kellough 
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(1998) analysis, they suggest that demographic variables such as race and gender can affect bureaucratic attitudes and behaviors indirectly through the mediating influence of the organizational role set. In addition, they intimate that on certain issues or behaviors, race and gender can also have direct effects.
Several points merit consideration in relating these findings to those of Selden, Brudney, and Kellough (1998) . First, the organizational role set we have developed here is a broader conception than the minority role set they advanced. It is rooted in the goals espoused for the organization, and not only is it especially appropriate for senior-level public managers such as the state agency heads who are the subject of the present inquiry, it is also generalizable to a wider sampling of administrators-all of whom may be distinguished by the importance they attach to particular organizational goals. Second, in focusing on a single organization, Selden, Brudney, and Kellough were able to measure agency outputs more adequately. By contrast, although the nine dependent variables we have explored in this study do not measure output directly, their use was made necessary by the significant heterogeneity encompassed in a sample consisting of administrators from ninety-three types of agencies in all fifty states. With strong measures of agency outputs, we might speculate that the amount of variance explained would, have been greater. Nevertheless, the findings substantiate the importance of the organizational role set for theories of representative bureaucracy, and they provide further insight into the processes through which senior administrators' demographic characteristics-race/ edinicity and gender-may affect state administration.
Prior studies of representative bureaucracy in state government have primarily addressed passive representation, asking whether nonwhite and women senior state administrators have achieved numbers equivalent to the composition of the larger population. In the present research, these demographic characteristics have been shown to relate to critical administrative attitudes and behaviors. The findings suggest that either this connection may be indirect through the organizational role set or in certain instances it may be direct. Governors and other officials with authority to appoint senior administrators have good reason to weigh the consequences of their choices and consider not only passive representation but active representation as well.
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